Tag Archives: checkpoint

Overturned DWI based on time between accident/blood drawn

A recent Missouri Western District Court of Appeals decision says a guilty verdict failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a driver was drunk at the time of the accident.
The appellate court essentially determined that too much time had transpired between an accident and when blood was drawn. That fact, plus that there was no evidence that the man had been driving his vehicle when it was driven off the road or evidence of when he became intoxicated led them to overturn the trial court.

The man was clearly drunk according to witnesses but they never observed him driving his vehicle or drinking. Witnesses drove him home and later went back to the scene and called the police. Police found empty beer cans in the vehicle and went to visit the man at his home. He clearly was intoxicated and could not stand to perform a walk and turn field sobriety test.

He was arrested at 11:40 p.m. and transported to the hospital due to concerns about the level of alcohol in his system. He refused to provide a blood sample. A warrant to draw blood sample was obtained and blood was drawn at 2:47 a.m. The test determined that his blood alcohol level was .129 at that time. The man was found guilty during a bench trial for DWI.

The Western District reversed the trial judge. They held that while the State established that he was intoxicated at the time he was first observed by witness, there was no evidence as to when the accident occurred, when the man last consumed alcohol or when he became intoxicated. The trial court erred in convicting him of driving while intoxicated because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a vehicle while intoxicated.

The court discussed the timing of the accident and the time blood was drawn to prove intoxication: “Wilhite raises one point on appeal. In his sole point on appeal, Wilhite argues that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of driving while intoxicated because the evidence failed to establish a temporal connection between Wilhite’s alleged operation of a motor vehicle and his intoxication.

“The offense of driving while intoxicated, section 577.010.1, requires proof of two elements: (1) that the defendant operated a motor vehicle, and (2) was intoxicated while doing so.” State v. Ollison, 236 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007).

Wilhite begins by arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he operated a motor vehicle because no one witnessed him actually driving the truck.
However, Wilhite was the only one at the accident scene on the side of a rural roadway and told Tracy that he was the only one in the vehicle. Based on these facts, the trial court could have reasonably inferred he was operating the truck at the time of the accident. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that he operated the vehicle. See State v. Besendorfer, 439 S.W.3d 831, 836-37 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014)(holding that circumstantial evidence, including Besendorfer admitting he was the only person in the truck when he was found, was sufficient evidence for “a reasonable trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Besendorfer had ‘operated’ his vehicle.”).

Wilhite then argues that there was insufficient evidence that he was intoxicated at the time he was operating the truck. “Proof of intoxication at the time of arrest, when remote from the operation of the vehicle, is insufficient in itself to prove intoxication at the
time the person was driving.” Ollison, 236 S.W.3d at 68. “In this remote circumstance, ‘time [is] an element of importance’ that the State must establish to meet its burden of proving the defendant drove while intoxicated.” State v. Davis, 217 S.W.3d 358, 360 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (quoting State v. Dodson, 496 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Mo. App. W.D. 1973).
“‘Remoteness’, as used in drunk driving cases, has two dimensions: remoteness in time from operating a vehicle, and remoteness in distance from the vehicle.” State v. Varnell, 316 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).

When the defendant is arrested at a remote time from the operation of the vehicle, the State must show further evidence than a test that reveals the defendant was intoxicated at the time of arrest. State v. Wilson, 273 S.W.3d 80, 82 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008). “There are two rationales for this requirement, but both have the same foundation: the longer the interval between driving and testing, the less accurately the test reflects the state of the driver at the time of the arrest.” Varnell, 316 S.W.3d at 514.

The first reason that an extended time period between driving and testing can result in an inaccurate test is that the defendant may have had time and opportunity to drink alcohol after he ceased driving. Id. The second rationale for requiring additional evidence is based on the manner in which alcohol is processed by the human body. Id. One does not become intoxicated immediately upon the ingestion of alcohol. Davis, 217 S.W.3d at 361. “[A]lcohol must be absorbed into the bloodstream before it affects a person, and it can take thirty to ninety minutes before the maximum blood alcohol level is reached.”
Varnell, 316 S.W.3d at 514. “[I]t is theoretically possible for a driver who quickly ingests alcohol immediately prior to taking a short drive to be in a sober condition when driving, but, due to process of absorption of alcohol into the bloodstream, to exceed the limit afterwards.” Id.

In this case, Wilhite was dropped off at his trailer at approximately 10:30 p.m. and was first contacted by Trooper Johnson at approximately 11:30 p.m. For this at least one hour there was no testimony as to Wilhite’s actions or his access to alcohol. Ward was present in the trailer for at least a portion of that time and testified at trial, but the State never inquired as to whether or not Wilhite had access to or consumed any alcohol during that time period. Wilhite was at home for a significant amount of time, giving him ample opportunity to consume alcohol after he drove the truck but prior to his first contact with Trooper Johnson and getting his blood drawn at least three hours later. There was no evidence to establish a correlation between the blood alcohol content reflected in the blood test result and Wilhite’s blood alcohol content at the unknown time he last operated the vehicle. However, the lack of a correlation between the test result and the operation of the vehicle is not dispositive of the issues in this case.”

The case, WD80701, originated in Boone County and the appeal was heard before Division Three Judges Victor C. Howard (Presiding Judge), Cynthia L. Martin, and Gary D. Witt. The opinion was written by Judge Witt, June 5, 2018.

MO Appellate Court rules on State’s driving eligibility rule

The Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District (Division Three) held last week that Missouri substantive law governs the Director or Revenue’s decisions when it comes to issuance, suspension, or revocation of a Missouri license regardless of the driver’s home state at the time of conviction. The interstate Driver License Compact does not supplant the Missouri 10-year ineligibility rule under §302.060(9), the appellate court said.

 

Here is the background of the case.  The Director of Revenue appealed the trial court’s judgment ordering the DOR to issue a Missouri driver’s license to William Thanner.

 

Thanner received three DWI convictions while residing in Georgia between 1996 and 2010. He completed all requirements for reinstatement in Georgia and had a valid Georgia license when he moved in 2015 to Missouri. The Director of DOR denied Thanner’s application for a Missouri license, citing §302.060(9) imposing a 10-year ban following two or more DWI convictions. Upon judicial review, the trial court ordered the Director to issue Thanner a Missouri license, reasoning that Thanner’s Georgia license was entitled to reciprocity under the interstate Driver License Compact (§302.600).

 

The trial court’s judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for the trial court to reinstate the Director’s denial of Thanner’s application for an unrestricted license and proceed on his request for limited driving privileges.

 

 The opinion was written by Judge’s Lisa Van Amburg with judges Angela T. Quigless and Robert G. Dowd, Jr., concurring. The attorney for Appellant was Rachel Jones and the attorney for Respondent was Keith Liberman.

 

The appellate court stated the following as to its analysis:

 

“Here, the trial court adopted Thanner’s rationale and conclusions of law, relying entirely on a dissent opining that §302.160 applies only to drivers holding a Missouri license when the out-of-state offense occurred, and citing full faith and credit without analysis.2 Johnston v. Director of Revenue, 305 S.W.3d 465 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). In that case, a Kentucky driver was convicted of DWI in 1996, but his conviction was not affirmed on appeal until 2006. In the interim, Johnston’s conviction remaining unreported, and he moved to Missouri and obtained a Missouri license in 2005. When the Kentucky DWI conviction was finally affirmed and reported in 2006, the Director suspended Johnston’s Missouri license. Despite the fact that Kentucky was Johnston’s home state at the time of the offense, this court affirmed the Director’s suspension, reasoning that the Director was entitled to rely on the conviction date as reported by Kentucky. While unusual on its chronological facts, Johnston remains instructive for its adherence to a strict liability approach to Missouri’s 10-year rule under §302.060(9), consistent with other appellate decisions cited above.

 

Thanner did not develop his full faith and credit argument into legal analysis and essentially abandoned it at oral argument, conceding that it does not mandate reciprocal recognition of state-specific licenses (e.g., drivers, teachers, lawyers).  Simply put, Missouri substantive law controls the Director’s issuance, suspension, or revocation of a Missouri license regardless of the driver’s home state at the time of the conviction. Nothing in the Compact mandates differential treatment.”

Fate of GPS for interlock ignition devices uncertain in Minn.

If you are a convicted drunk driver in the state of Minnesota, your location is being tracked through a GPS tracking system.  However, the Minnesota state legislature never approved its current use by the Department of Public Safety. 

It should be noted for our Missouri readers that the State of Missouri, through the Department of Revenue, requires GPS tracking for hardship licenses and reinstatement after a DWI.

There are some 11,000 convicted DUI drivers in Minnesota.  The DPS is currently tracking their whereabouts with GPS.  The interlock ignition law was passed in 2010 without the intention of tracking drivers with a GPS system.  Some legislators in Minnesota are concerned about whether this tracking is overreaching and unconstitutional.

A bi-partisan group of lawmakers are proposing a bill to end the use of GPS tracking of DUI offenders using ignition interlock equipment.

Opponents of the GPS tracking say that the issue is not that they are being tracked while driving drunk but that they are being tracked while they are sober. During recent hearings on the issue, the ACLU has stated that GPS tracking equates to a 4th Amendment search.  Criminal defense attorneys have testified that prosecutors could subpoena the GPS data for other criminal cases that are not connected to the DUI conviction.

The DPS has argued that the advantage of GPS is that they have immediate reporting of user violations, allowing them to take instant action instead of waiting at least 30 days to check a driver’s log.  Log verification was how it was done in the past.  DPS further states that they do not use or store data that they receive beyond the actual day it was recorded.

The proposed bill has received two amendments out of committee. The amendments would mandate that all DUI convicted Interlock users must be informed that their interlock device could potentially track them via GPS, and that they can be turned on by a court order.

Santa Fe says strict consequences for DWI are resulting in fewer

Experts in Santa Fe, New Mexico are pointing the strict consequences for a Driving While Intoxicated charge for the drop in alcohol related accidents between 2012 and 2013. Records indicate that the number of alcohol related crashes in Santa Fe was 106 in 2013 from 128 in 2012.

New Mexico is the national leader for Ignition Interlock Devices installed per 10,000 residents. State law requires an IID for all DWI offenders. The City of Santa Fe and Santa Fe County also permit vehicle forfeiture if you are arrested for a DWI and already have a conviction on your record. Not only that, since 2009 the police can seize your vehicle if you are caught Driving While Revoked as well. Last year 554 vehicles were seized under these provisions.

Lawmakers correlate the re-arrest rate of first time offenders dropping 55% since 2002 and the reduction of alcohol involved crashes by 40% between 2002 and 2010 to ignition interlock devices, checkpoints, saturation patrols, vehicle seizures and public awareness.