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St. Charles City Municipal Court

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This page contains Court information and links for St. Charles, Missouri.

St. Charles Municipal Court
1781 Zumbehl Rd

St. Charles, MO 63301

Phone: 636-949-3378

City of St. Charles, MO. Check the website to find a list of fines.

Court Hours
Monday-Thursday
9:00am – 4:00pm

Friday

10:00am -4:00pm

A juror’s lapsed attention not a mistrial

Juror’s whose attention lapsed during a trial is not enough to have a criminal conviction overturned. Also, evidence that two alternate jurors did fall asleep was not enough to declare a mistrial.

The Appellant (Defendant) appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, Western District of Missouri. He was convicted of one count of kidnapping in the first degree, two counts of rape in the first degree, and one count of sodomy in the first degree following a jury trial.

Appellant argued two points on appeal, the first of which was that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a mistrial based on alleged juror misconduct.

Appellant claimed that four jurors should have been discharged for falling asleep during trial.  However, the record showed that two of those jurors did not participate in deliberations; therefore, the appellate court stated that the appellant could not have suffered prejudice.

And as to the two jurors who actually deliberated on the trial, the appellate court stated the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding, based on its own observations and testimony from the two jurors, that they either had not fallen asleep or had not failed to hear the evidence. Therefore, those facts did not violate constitutional and statutory guarantees to a jury trial, require removal of a juror, or declare for a mistrial.

The Argument

Appellant argued the record showed that four jurors 

slept through parts of the trial so that they were not able to accurately assess the voluminous evidence presented.

He claimed that by allowing jurors who slept during trial to stay on the jury, the trial court violated his right to a fair trial, an impartial jury, and due process guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution, and by Article I, sections 10 and 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution, and that these constitutional errors were structural in nature.

But in order to prevail upon a claim of juror misconduct, the appellant must show the conduct was prejudicial to the defendant. However, Missouri case law in State v. Whitman has said that the reviewing court gives a lot of discretion to the trial court.

Appellate Court also stated that Appellant had not sustained his burden to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to discharge jurors. “Because it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to discharge jurors at [Appellant’s] request, [Appellant’s] contention that the trial court would have been required to grant a mistrial after discharging four jurors is rendered moot.”

The Transcript Record

During a break in Victim’s testimony on the second day of trial, each of the two attorneys representing Appellant informed the trial court that two jurors seemed to be asleep.

Defense counsel No.1 stated: “I noticed they had their eyes closed. I did not think they were asleep, but we’ll have to. . .” Defense counsel no. 2 stated: “39 was definitely asleep. [Court reporter] is nodding her head. He was definitely asleep.”

The trial court at that time of discussion decided not to take action.  Instead, it made another juror the second alternate when the jury retired for deliberation.

But the Defense counsel had also again raised concerns about jurors sleeping on the third day of trial and pointed out to the court and for the record the following:

“And Your Honor, I’m just wanting to make a record that Jurors Number 10 and 26, who are different jurors than yesterday, were both sleeping during different points of the testimony. Juror Number 26, [I] kept seeing her head again kind of fall down and towards her chest. . . . Juror 10, her head kept falling down. Juror 26, her head kept falling back and at one point I was watching her breathe and she was taking really deep, even breaths like she was asleep, and her eyes were closed at that time.”

The Trial Court stated: “Okay. I’ve been watching. I’m not specific on those two jurors. I’ve been watching them and I’ve counted, they all seem to be coming back before I can count to ten, so that’s kind of been my handle on it. So what’s your request going to be with the sleeping jurors?”

Defense counsel no. 1: “With the sleeping jurors, the fact that there’s four of them is troublesome, but I’m going to be asking to strike all of the ones that have been missing the evidence.”

Trial Court: “If you strike all of them, I’m declaring a mistrial.”

Defense counsel no. 1 said he understood that and later stated he was striking all four of them.

The Trial Court then asked the State its position, to which the prosecutor stated: “I have not witnessed jurors sleeping. The moments I’ve looked at the jury, they’ve all been awake and I’ve found to be attentive.”

Defense Attorney no. 2: “We had already decided that he would be an alternate, but during the video, a great portion of it, both Juror 29 and 10 slept through a great portion of it. And then after the video concluded and the State was going through all of the evidence on the back bench there, both Juror 26 and 10 continued to sleep. It wasn’t just for brief moments here and there, but for a huge portion of the video shown, they were sleeping.

The Trial Court then opened the jurors up for questioning.

Juror 10 admitted that she “probably nodded here and there,” but she said that “[couldn’t] promise that [she] fell asleep because [she felt] like [she] heard everything” and that, to her knowledge, she had not missed anything. Juror 26 stated that she had not fallen asleep and instead was merely listening with her eyes closed. Juror 39 indicated that, on a couple occasions, he may have “dozed off for just a second” before catching himself. Juror 39 did not believe that he had missed any testimony. Juror 51 stated that she had not fallen asleep and instead put her head down because it helped her hear better.”

Defense attorneys were given the chance to question the four jurors but chose not to do so. The Trial Court then denied the defendant’s request to discharge any of the jurors.  The Appellant Court stated that “As a result, there was no need for the trial court to consider whether to declare a mistrial. This was not an abuse of discretion.”

Appellate Court Reasoning

The Appellate Court reasoned that at most, Juror 10 confessed to a lapse of attention, which is not grounds to remove a juror. The court cited the Whitman case: “A lapse of attention is not grounds to remove a juror for sleeping.”

It went on to say that Juror 26 said she was listening to the evidence with her eyes closed, and never dozed off. “It was well within the trial court’s sound discretion to conclude, based on its own observations of the jury and based on testimony from the jurors in question, that the behavior of Jurors 10 and 26 did not warrant disqualification from the jury and thus did not warrant declaring a mistrial.”

The decision was made by Appellate Judges Cynthia L. Martin, (Chief Judge, Presiding), Karen King Mitchell, and Anthony Rex Gabbert.

Wrong jurisdiction argument fails in DWI case

A Missouri man loses appeal of his license revocation after arguing that the officer, who was outside his county and jurisdiction when he demanded a chemical test, was not legally an officer per statutory requirement to make an arrest for his refusal.

The man had refused a DWI chemical test after the arresting deputy officer visited him in a hospital outside his county. Appellate argued that his situation was similar to a criminal case that would prohibit an arrest outside of an officer’s jurisdiction. However, the Western District Court of Appeals stated that such fresh pursuit doctrine only applies to a criminal case, not a civil driver’s license revocation case by the Department of Revenue. In the end, the court rejected his appeal, and the revocation of his driver’s license was upheld.

The man also had raised a second question on appeal about whether his account of what happened that he gave the officer upon being stopped could be used as evidence of the man’s intoxication while driving.  He argued that the trialcourt erred in finding there were reasonable grounds to believe that he was driving a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.

Background

An officer of the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office received a dispatch about a single-vehicle accident with injuries in Clinton County. When the deputy arrived at the scene, he found Appellant’s vehicle appeared to have a struck a tree. Firefighters at the scene informed Deputy that the driver of the vehicle was in an ambulance at the Fire Department. At the Fire Department, fire and EMT personnel informed Deputy that Appellant’s mother had brought him to the department, telling them that her son had been in an accident. They further informed the deputy that Appellant had lacerations on his head, that they were going to transport him to Liberty Hospital in Clay County to check for possible internal head injuries, and that they believed he had been drinking because of the smell of alcohol from his breath.

Deputy contacted Appellant in the back of the ambulance. The deputy could smell a moderate odor of intoxicating beverage coming from him. He asked Appellant what had happened. Appellant told him that he had been in a vehicle accident. He asked Appellant what caused him to wreck his vehicle, and Appellant told him that he had a sneezing fit causing him to look away from the road and that he hit a spot on the gravel road causing his vehicle to “shoot” off the roadway. Deputy asked Appellant if he had consumed any intoxicating beverages, and Appellant responded that he had had “a couple beers.”  When the deputy asked him to be more specific, Appellant said “about three beers.” The deputy then asked when he had started drinking, and Appellant said “after he got off work, at approximately [3:00 p.m.]” Appellant also told the deputy that he stopped drinking “about four hours ago” and that he had been in the back of the ambulance “for a couple hours.”

Deputy asked Appellant where he had consumed the alcohol, and Appellant said that he was drinking in his car. Appellant also told the deputy that he has a drinking problem and that he has been trying to get it under control. Finally, Appellant told Deputy that after he wrecked his car, he left the scene on foot and went to his parent’s house and that his family then took him to the Holt Fire Department.

The Deputy performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, to which he detected all six clues of intoxication. He observed Appellant’s eyes to be watery, bloodshot, and glassy. He had Appellant sent to a hospital in Clay County which was located outside of his jurisdiction. Deputy returned to the scene where he found beer cans and beer boxes on the ground outside the vehicle. On the inside of the vehicle, he found three beer boxes—one on the front passenger seat and two in the back seat. He saw two crushed cans stuffed between the passenger seat and middle console.

When at the hospital, Appellant refused to submit to a chemical test.

Deputy issued Appellant a revocation notice for his refusal to submit to the alcohol test and requested an attorney. Appellant was discharged from the hospital and placed into custody for driving while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident.  Appellant would later file a petition for review of the revocation of his driver’s license.

Holding

As to the first point on appeal, it was neither disputed that the arresting deputy was employed as a deputy sheriff in Clinton County, nor was it disputed that he had the power and duty to make arrests for state law violations.

Although the fresh pursuit doctrine applies to criminal procedure law, the fact that the deputy requested that Appellant submit to a chemical test outside of his jurisdiction in Clay County did not prevent the Director of Revenue from revoking Appellant’s driver’s license.  The Appellate Court cited Mason v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 426, 428-29 (Mo. App. S.D. 2010). In that case, the appellate had argued there was no lawful arrest because as in this case the arresting officer was outside of his jurisdiction.  The Southern District in the Mason case determined that the trial court erred in concluding a lawful arrest was even required in the refusal case. 

The Appellate Court in this case stated: “As in Sterneker, Jennings, and Mason, nothing in sections 302.574, 577.041, or 577.020 requires compliance with criminal procedural law regarding jurisdiction and fresh pursuit. Like cases under sections 302.500 to 302.540 (revocation or suspension of a license for driving with a BAC in excess of the legal limits), cases under section 302.574 are administrative law cases, not criminal cases, and the General Assembly is free to set the boundaries and procedures for them.”

The second point on appeal in this case also was denied. The Appellate Court pointed to numerous facts to show that the trial court did not err in determining that the Director of Revenue presented sufficient evidence that the Deputy had reasonable grounds to believe the Appellant was driving while intoxicated.

  • Appellant’s vehicle was found on the side of a straight, dry, gravel road during the day, crashed into a tree.
  • Appellant admitted he had been driving, wrecked his car, and drank three beers.
  • Gave contradictory statements regarding when he stopped drinking.
  • Stated to the Deputy that after the accident, he walked to his parents’ house and did not indicate that he remained at the scene.
  • Beer cans and boxes were found at the accident scene.
  • Deputy observed Appellant’s eyes were watery, bloodshot, and glassy and his speech was slurred and confused.
  • Appellant had a moderate odor of intoxicating beverage coming from him.
  • Appellant showed all six clues of intoxication on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus minutes after the accident.

The Western District opinion was written by Thomas N. Chapman, Presiding Judge.

Missouri Real ID

Updates on Mo. REAL ID compliant driver’s license

For those of you having to get your driver’s license renewed or a license for the first time, be ready for what may seem to you as a trick question. Do you want a driver’s license or ID card marked as compliant REAL ID or a regular license marked non-compliant?

Those of you who have recently visited your local Department of Motor Vehicle licensing office know what we’re talking about.  But if you don’t have any idea as to what the choice is all about, you may be wondering what to do.

The Missouri Department of Revenue has a great resource on its Website that breaks down the information surrounding the new licenses. But below we summarized the Website’s more salient points on the REAL ID.

So what is the “REAL ID”?

“REAL ID” comes from the REAL ID Act of 2005.  It was a federal law that focused on fraud protection, anti-terrorism, and driver license and nondriver license identification card (ID card) security.

The REAL ID Act established minimum security standards for state-issued driver licenses and ID cards and prohibits federal agencies from accepting for official purposes driver licenses and ID cards from states that do not meet these standards. But be happy. The state of Missouri achieved full implementation of its REAL ID program in 2019 and has been issuing the REAL ID to those requesting it.  And for Missouri drivers, that’s a good thing.

Why? Because starting October 1, 2021, residents of every U.S. state and territory wanting to board a federally regulated domestic flight, will be required to present a REAL ID-compliant driver license or ID card, or another form of ID accepted by the Transportation Security Administration.

Military requirements of the REAL ID

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) recently finalized an update to its DoD-wide installation security policy and is in the process of no longer accepting noncompliant marked cards across all of its facilities and installations. This means the military is in the process of no longer accepting driver licenses or nondriver identification cards marked as being noncompliant with REAL ID for the purposes of accessing a military base. This policy change impacts DoD installations in all states, not just Missouri.

Prior to October 1, 2021, military bases will accept licenses and ID cards marked as being REAL ID-compliant or Missouri licenses and ID cards issued prior to March 25, 2019, which have no REAL ID marking, compliant or noncompliant. In Missouri, a license or ID card that is noncompliant with REAL ID will have “NOT FOR REAL ID PURPOSES” in the upper right-hand corner. Anyone attempting to access a military base with a Missouri-issued license or ID card marked as “NOT FOR REAL ID PURPOSES” may be denied entry.

TIP: To ensure you have the proper identification, you should contact the military base you plan to visit in advance to obtain information regarding identification requirements.

Also beginning October 1, 2021, individuals must present a REAL ID-compliant driver license or ID card, or another form of acceptable ID, to access federal facilities and to enter nuclear power plants.

Do I need a REAL ID-compliant driver license or nondriver ID card?

It depends. Effective October 1, 2021, you will be required to present a REAL ID-compliant driver license or nondriver ID card, or another form of identification accepted by the Transportation Security Administration, to board domestic flights. Also beginning October 1, 2021, you will be required to present a REAL ID-compliant license or ID card, or another form of acceptable ID, to access federal facilities and to enter nuclear power plants.

However, you are not required and likely do not need to obtain a REAL ID-compliant license or ID card if:

1) You will not need one for any of the above purposes on or after October 1, 2021; or

2) You hold another form of identification that meets federal requirements, such as a valid U.S. passport or passport card.

It’s really your choice

So, does Missouri law require me to hold a REAL ID-compliant driver license or nondriver ID card? No. Under Missouri law, applying for a REAL ID-compliant driver license or nondriver ID card is your choice. Issuance of a REAL ID-compliant license or ID card is not mandatory.

So you will be required to present a REAL ID driver license, nondriver ID card, or other form of identification that meets federal requirements to board domestic flights, access federal facilities, and enter nuclear power plants on October 1, 2021. Prior to October 1, 2021, you can continue to use your current Missouri-issued driver license or nondriver ID card, regardless of whether it is REAL ID-compliant.

Can I get the new ID now?

Yes, Missouri residents were able to apply for a REAL ID-compliant Missouri driver license or nondriver ID card beginning March 25, 2019. Please note: Missouri licenses and ID cards issued prior to March 25, 2019, will afford you the same access as a REAL ID-compliant license or ID card until October 1, 2021.

TIP: When applying for a REAL ID-compliant license or ID card, please allow time for its processing and mailing (typically 10-15 days). If you need to fly on October 1, 2021, and you wait to renew until September 30, 2021, you will not receive your REAL ID-compliant license or ID card in time to fly. Consider renewing no later than September 1, 2021, if you will need to fly on or soon after October 1, 2021, to allow sufficient time for delivery of your license or ID card.

Sky is falling; I need my new ID now!

If you’re panicking about whether you need to rush to the DMV to get your REAL ID compliance license or nondriver ID card today because you need to driver to work, vote or register to vote, for state ID purposes, or age verification, don’t sweat it. The REAL ID Act does not invalidate any previously issued Missouri driver license or nondriver ID card. It does not affect current use of your license or ID card for the purpose of driving, voting or registering to vote, state purposes, or for age verification.

Moving enforcement date

If you were thinking there was not enough time, the REAL ID enforcement deadline was originally October 1, 2020, and recently extended a year later to October 1, 2021 because of circumstances related t the COVID-19 pandemic.  You can read the full statement from DHS: dhs.gov/news/2020/03/26/acting-secretary-chad-wolf-statement-real-id-enforcement-deadline.

Enhancing DWI sentences with prior convictions

In this case, Defendant/Appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Platte County. The trial court found that Defendant was a habitual offender due to six prior intoxication-related traffic offenses. The Court entered a conviction for the class B felony of driving while intoxicated and sentenced him accordingly. Defendant appealed.

While he argued three points, only one is covered in this post. Specifically,  the trial court erred in finding he was a habitual offender because the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove two of his prior convictions qualify as intoxication-related traffic offenses(“IRTOs”).  He argued a 1996 amendment narrowed the definition of “driving” such that it no longer includes “being in actual physical control” of a vehicle.

He argued that two of his convictions from 1993 may have involved only being in physical control of the vehicle rather than physically driving or operating the vehicle as “driving” and “operating” were defined at the time of his present offense. He pointed out that the removal of the phrase “or being in actual physical control” from the statute would thus make those convictions no longer IRTOs.

Defendant’s issue was whether the evidence presented by the State showing that he had two 1993 convictions for “DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED” is sufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct giving rise to those convictions was for driving or operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, given that he might have been convicted for conduct (being in physical control rather than physically driving or operating) that would not constitute an IRTO at the time of his present (2017) offense.

The Appellate Court ended up denying this first point. The Court held that the trial court did not err in finding that the State’s evidence was sufficient to prove that Defendant’s prior convictions qualified as intoxication-related traffic offenses for purposes of sentence enhancement. 

The evidence included records from the driving while intoxicated tracking system (DWITS) and the Department of Revenue showing that Defendant was convicted for driving while intoxicated. And the Defendant presented no evidence or argument that these convictions were for conduct other than driving or operating.

The State had argued that, at minimum, the State’s evidence (the DWITS and DOR records indicating that Defendant was “driving” (while intoxicated) established a prima facie case that Defendant had a sufficient number of priors, and therefore, it was incumbent on Defendant to introduce evidence that the convictions did not occur or were for conduct that no longer constitutes an IRTO.

Defendant contended that the trial court erred in finding him to be a habitual DWI offender, because there was insufficient evidence to prove that two of his six prior convictions qualified as intoxication-related traffic offenses(“IRTOs”). Driving while intoxicated is a class B felony if the defendant is a habitual offender, whereas the offense is a class C felony if the defendant is a chronic offender.

Section 577.010 of state statues establishes that a “habitual offender” is a person found guilty of five or more IRTOs committed on separate occasions, while a “chronic offender” is a person who has been found guilty of four or more such IRTOs.

Then Section 577.023.4 provides: “Evidence offered as proof of the defendant’s status as a. . . habitual offender. . . shall include but not be limited to evidence of findings of guilt received by a search of the records of the Missouri uniform law enforcement system, including criminal history records from the central repository or records from the driving while intoxicated tracking system (DWITS) maintained by the Missouri state highway patrol, or the certified driving record maintained by the Missouri department of revenue. The State has the burden to prove prior IRTOs beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The Appellate Court stated: “Although the State’s evidence does not entirely exclude the possibility that [Defendant] may have been convicted for conduct that no longer qualifies as an IRTO, “we cannot say here that it was unreasonable for the trial court to infer that [Defendant’s past]conviction[s]for ‘driving while intoxicated’ [were]conviction[s]for driving while intoxicated.” Cordell, 500 S.W.3d at 347.Once the state made its prima facie showing, [Defendant] was capable of making appropriate arguments and/or introducing evidence to rebut the reasonable inference that the convictions constituted valid IRTOs under the statute. However, absent such a showing by [Defendant], we cannot say that the trial court’s inference was unreasonable.”

Therefore, enough evidence existed to convict Defendant as a habitual offender.

The following judges heard the case: Witt, Hardwick and Chapman. The Opinion was written by Judge Thomas N. Chapman.

Probable cause not needed for traffic stop

In this DWI appeal of an administrative license suspension, probable cause is not necessary for a traffic stop. However, probable cause is needed to arrest a driver for an alcohol-related offense. Furthermore, probable cause to arrest a driver for an alcohol-related offense does not require field sobriety tests. Instead, other indicia of intoxication—like refusal to take a field sobriety test—are sufficient.

In this case, the Director of the Department of Revenue appeals the trial court’s judgment setting aside the suspension of Defendant’s driving privileges pursuant to section 302.505, RSMo. The Director argued the trial court committed legal error by requiring field sobriety tests and evidence of criminal activity before a traffic stop.

In the first point on appeal, the Director challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the Director did not meet its burden to establish probable cause to arrest Defendant because no field sobriety tests were performed. The Director argued this was legal error because field sobriety tests are not required to establish probable cause to arrest for an alcohol-related offense.

In this case, the Officer stated that he detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from Turner and his truck, his eyes were watery, and his speech was slurred. Defendant admitted to drinking alcohol earlier in the night. The Officer testified that he attempted to perform field sobriety tests; however, Defendant refused to perform the tests, telling the deputies, “I can’t,” and “I won’t pass them.”

Defendant was then placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated. Despite this evidence which was deemed credible by the trial court, the trial court found that the Director did not sustain its burden to establish probable cause to arrest Defendant “for an alcohol-related offense, in that: no field sobriety tests performed.”

The Appellate Court’s decision cited other cases that stated that “‘Even in the absence of any field sobriety tests, we have held similar observations by an arresting officer to constitute sufficient evidence to meet the test of probable cause.'” Id. (quoting Terry, 14 S.W.3d at 725). Though field sobriety tests are not required, the refusal to take field sobriety tests constitutes evidence of intoxication in administrative license proceedings.”

The Appellate Court said that settled precedent in Missouri provides that the sufficiency of the legal basis to justify the initial traffic stop is immaterial in an administrative suspension hearing. They pointed to the case of In Riche v. Director of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331(Mo. banc 1999). In that case the Supreme Court held: “[N]either section 302.505.1 nor the constitution[] . . . require that the arresting officer’s initial stop be based upon probable cause. To the extent that [other Missouri cases] impose a probable cause requirement on the initial stop and apply the exclusionary rule in section 302.505 proceedings, they are overruled.”

The Appellate Court ended up reversing the lower court’s judgment holding:

First, the trial court committed legal error by relying on a finding that there was insufficient evidence of criminal activity to support a traffic stop to conclude that the Director had not met its burden to establish probable cause to arrest Turner for an alcohol-related traffic offense.

The opinion handed down pointed to section 302.505. It said that the Director is not required to establish that there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop; rather, the Director must establish that there was probable cause to arrest the driver for an alcohol related traffic offense.

Second, the trial court committed legal error by relying on a finding that no field sobriety tests were conducted to conclude that the Director had not met its burden to establish probable cause to arrest Defendant for driving in violation of an alcohol-related traffic offense. Field sobriety tests are not mandatory, the Court held. It added, that the refusal to take field sobriety tests constituted evidence of intoxication in administrative license proceedings.

Third, the evidence presented by the Director, deemed credible by the trial judge, was sufficient to establish that there was probable cause to arrest Defendant for an alcohol related traffic offense.  It further stated that his BAC exceeded the legal limit of .08 percent.

The opinion was written by Judge Cynthia L. Martin.

Source of Breath Analyzer Not Relevant in DWI Case

When it comes to DWI cases, the use of breath analyzer equipment is important but the source of its manufacturer is not.

At least that is what a recent Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District case decided.

The Director of Revenue was appealing the judgment of a trial court in St. Charles County.  The judgment reinstated the driver’s driving privileges after the Director had suspended them after driver’s arrest for DWI.

The Director’s argument was that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of the Driver’s blood alcohol content (BAC). The court’s decision was based on the Director failing to establish that the Intox EC/IR II breath analyzer used to determine the Driver’s BAC was not manufactured or supplied by a certain company, namely Intoximeters, Inc. of St. Louis.

The appellate court ended up reversing and remanding the decision of the trial court, essentially holding that the source of a breath analyzer is irrelevant.

Case Background

The O’Fallon Police Department responded to the scene of an accident, where a moving car had struck a 2 parked vehicle, turned on its side, and caught fire.

A police officer questioned the driver at the scene, who admitted driving the vehicle with a passenger.

Both driver and passenger appeared intoxicated and could not explain what or how the accident happened. Officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol on the driver and observed him to have bloodshot, glassy eyes. The driver admitted he had been drinking vodka, and that he drank more than usual that day.

The driver was placed under arrest after performing poorly on field sobriety tests.

At the police department, the driver’s breath was tested using an Intox EC/IR II breath analyzer. The BAC was .153 percent. The Director notified the driver it was suspending his driving privileges, and he petitioned the trial court for a trial de novo.

Holding of Case

The Director argued in its appeal that establishing the manufacturer or supplier has no bearing on the reliability of the test results under the regulations. Furthermore, because the operators followed all regulations to ensure proper functioning of the Intox EC/IR II in this case, by identifying it by name and serial number, the test results were admissible.

The Division held that the following statute, 19 CSR 25-30.050 (2014), contains a list of approved breath analyzers, as well as a corresponding list of the manufacturer or supplier of each approved breath analyzer. However, there is no language stating an approved breath analyzer “shall be from” the listed manufacturer or supplier, as appears in a similar regulation relating to calibration materials for breath analyzers.

The opinion explained quoting case law that to lay a foundation for the admission of breath analyzer test results, the Director must establish that the test was performed: “(1) by following the approved techniques and methods of the Division of Health; (2) by an operator holding a valid permit; (3) on equipment and devices approved by the division.”

Yes, the court explained, that the Foundation for admitting breath test results includes “equipment and devices approved by the [D]ivision” of Health and Senior Services, and regulation describes the approved devices by model and “manufacturer or supplier.” But the key to their decision in this case was that the manufacturer or supplier is not among the items in that same regulation’s checklist for operating the breath analyzer.  Therefore, no testimony on where the device came from is necessary to admit the breath analyzer’s results.

The appellate court found that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the driver’s BAC and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

The opinion was written by Presiding Judge Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., with judges Phillip M. Hess and Michael E. Gardner concurring.

Don’t be an idiot driver like this guy

A post on the Alpharetta, Georgia Police Department’s Facebook page said that when law enforcement clocked a speeding vehicle recently, it wasn’t worth even chasing him down the highway. 

That’s right.  The officer did not attempt to stop the driver of a sportbike motorcycle.  Why is that? The driver was clocked at 176 mph.  Instead, the Alpharetta police passed along a description of the motorcyclist to agencies farther south on Ga. 400.

“Hopefully, the driver of the sportbike matures a little before a tragedy happens,” the agency said.

A sportbike is a motorcycle optimized for speed, acceleration, braking, and cornering on paved roads.  Apparently high speed vehicles like sportbikes have been a growing fad recently. With fewer people on the road due to the coronavirus pandemic, motorists have been putting the pedal to the metal.

Statistics are showing a big increase in speeding tickets in Georgia.  In late April, tickets for speeding at 100 mph or more were up nearly two-thirds statewide from last year, according to the Georgia State Patrol.  One two-week period saw Troopers write 140 citations.  This statistic does not count tickets issued by many local police departments.

In Georgia, like in Missouri, speeding is a misdemeanor.  In Georgia, speeding is punishable by fines of up to $1,000.  However, fines can vary depending on where you get caught and how fast you were going. Another $200 can be added to the fine for extremely high speeding of those traveling 75 mph or more on a two-lane road or 85 mph and above on any road or highway.

If the fine doesn’t destroy your day, remember this.  Many jurisdictions with speeding cases 100 mph or faster require a driver to go straight to jail.

At least that was the case prior to Covid-19 pandemic. Some jurisdictions in Georgia are not seeking arrests for fear of spreading the coronavirus in local jails. You got to wonder if this doesn’t only encourage speeding.

But perhaps one man’s response on Facebook to this post puts it best:

“Think I’ve seen that bike, got passed by a guy doing well over hundy few days ago on 400. Seems like they could figure out a way to stop him before he takes the dirt nap (or causes somebody else to.)”

Well said Sir.  Needless to say, this guy got lucky.  Not because he didn’t get a ticket for doing 176 mph, but because he didn’t kill himself or another person.  Drive smart. Don’t be this guy!

Shrewsbury Municipal Court

Located in St. Louis County

Shrewsbury Municipal Court
Mike Pauley, Court Administrator
4400 Shrewsbury Ave
St. Louis County, MO 63119
(314) 647-8634 ext 5

Please check the court website for COVID Procedures

Municipal Judge
Hon. A. Gentry Smith

Prosecuting Attorney

John Bouhasin

Court Dates and Docket Dates
Doors open at 5:30 on Court dates, Court begins at 6:30pm. Court is on the 2nd and 3rd Tuesdays.

Did you get a ticket in the municipality of Shrewsbury? What should you do?

If you received a moving violation you have 3 options:

  1. Pay it
  2. Go to court and try to fight it yourself
  3. Hire an attorney.

If you pay it, there will be points assessed to your license. This can cause your insurance rates to go up and/or cause your license to be suspended. Eight points in 18 months can result in a license suspension.

If you try to fight it yourself, the first time you appear in court, your case will not be heard. You will be required to wait and then stand in front of the judge to plead guilty or not guilty. If you plead not guilty, the judge will set your case for trial and you will have to come back at another date. Taking care of the ticket yourself will result in at least two court appearances taking upwards of an hour a piece. Then if you lose, you will be required to pay the fine anyway.

If you hire an attorney, you will likely avoid the appearance and our goal is to get your moving violation amended to a non-moving violation. We have worked in the Shrewsbury Municipal Court for over 15 years. We work with the prosecuting attorney to get your ticket reduced. We then notify you via email and hard copy and all you have to do is mail in your payment. Usually this process requires no appearance in court on your part saving you time and energy. For a free consultation, fill out our easy ticket submission form and one of our attorneys will contact you.

Shrewsbury MIP Defense

  • Our Shrewsbury MIP lawyers handle MIP defense, where the object is keeping your record clean and your driver license from being suspended

Shrewsbury DWI Defense

  • Our Shrewsbury DWI attorneys handle drunk driving defense, where your driver license and your freedom are at stake.

Let our Shrewsbury Traffic Lawyers start helping you today. Contact Us

Shrewsbury Traffic Court Information

This page contains Court information Links for Shrewsbury, Missouri.

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Reasonable grounds found to prove intoxication

A recent Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District case shows law enforcement or witnesses do not need to observe a driver weaving between lanes or actually crashing to prove a person intoxicated. Instead, it can be a combination of facts indicating he was drinking and driving, along with failing fielding sobriety tests, and witness statements. All that qualifies as reasonable grounds to charge a driver with driving while intoxicated.

The Appellant/Defendant appealed the trial court’s judgment upholding the Director of Revenue’s (Director) revocation of his driving privileges for refusing to submit to a breath test, claiming the trial court erred because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause to believe Appellant drove while intoxicated.

The Appellate court held that Trial Court had substantial evidence before it to support its finding that the law enforcement officer (Officer) had probable cause to believe Appellant was driving while intoxicated. The Director presented sufficient evidence that the Officer had reasonable grounds to believe Appellant drove while intoxicated.

Appellant’s sole point on appeal was there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause to believe Appellant drove while intoxicated. Appellant argued the Director failed to present evidence as to Appellant’s condition while operating a motor vehicle at the time of the accident.

After all, Appellant argues, the arresting officer did not witness his driving, the accident itself, or even his condition.

Facts of Case

Here is some background. It was just before midnight when the Officer responded to a vehicle crash. Upon arrival he saw a vehicle consumed in flames, a broken mailbox, and two damaged vehicles in a driveway.

Officer spoke with two residents of the house who were the Appellant’s parents. Appellant’s father stated Appellant was driving and crashed, sustaining an injury to his head. Appellant’s parents stated Appellant was inside.

Officer continually asked to speak with Appellant, but Appellant’s parents refused. Officer asked Appellant’s parents if Appellant had been drinking. Appellant’s father remained silent, but Appellant’s mother nodded her head in an up and down motion. Moments later, Officer overheard Appellant’s father tell a neighbor Appellant was driving on a road adjacent to the road he crashed on and into the driveway. Officer’s supervisor then spoke with Appellant’s parents. Approximately 15 minutes after Officer’s arrival, Appellant’s parents allowed him to speak with Appellant. Officer noted scratches and a cut on Appellant’s face. Officer noted Appellant’s eyes were watery, glassy, and slightly bloodshot. Officer also smelled a moderate odor of alcohol emitting from Appellant’s breath.

Officer escorted Appellant to an ambulance noticing Appellant was unsteady on his feet. Appellant then refused further medical attention. Appellant was transferred to the police department. Officer continued to smell alcohol emitting from Appellant’s breath at the station and noted Appellant slurring his speech.

Appellant consented to the Standard Field Sobriety Test. The results of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”) test revealed Appellant’s eyes tracked equally and pupils were of equal size. However, Appellant had no smooth pursuit in both eyes, distinct and sustained nystagmus was observed at maximum deviation in both eyes, and nystagmus was detected in the left eye prior to 45 degrees.

During the Walk and Turn (“WAT”) test, Appellant did not touch heel to toe on multiple steps, used his arms for balance, and took the incorrect number of steps.

During the One Leg Stand (“OLS”) test, Appellant put his foot down twice. The first attempt ended in approximately eight seconds and his second attempt ended in approximately 15 seconds.

 Officer advised Appellant of Missouri’s Implied Consent and requested a breath sample. Appellant refused the breath test. Officer read Appellant his Miranda Rights, placing him under arrest. Officer asked if Appellant was operating the vehicle at the time of the crash. Appellant stated, “I guess so.” Appellant also stated he had not been drinking and was not presently under the influence.

Argument, Analysis and Findings

One of the issues Appellant argued was the Director’s failure to establish the time of the accident; therefore, there no probable cause could exist to arrest him for driving while intoxicated.

Officer gave vague testimony regarding the crash time and the Alcohol Inference Report (“AIR”), admitted into evidence with no objection by Appellant, provided an estimated time of the crash at 2359 hours.

Since the trial court found for the Director and did not issue a specific finding of fact on this issue, the trial court found Officer’s testimony and report to be credible.

The Appellate Court stated that under our standard, the time between the accident and Officer’s first contact with Appellant was approximately 16 minutes. Regardless, it is unnecessary for the Director to prove the exact time the accident occurred to determine whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the suspect drove while intoxicated.

Read the following excerpt from the appellate case to understand how the reviewing court came to its conclusion:

 “‘Reasonable grounds’ is virtually synonymous with probable cause.” Hinnah, 77 S.W.3d at 621. “Probable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer’s knowledge of the particular facts and circumstances is sufficient to warrant a prudent person’s belief that a suspect has committed an offense.” Id. (quoting State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 767 (Mo. banc 1996)). Suspicion alone is not enough to establish reasonable grounds, or probable cause, but absolute certainty is not required. Rain v. Dir. of Revenue, 46 S.W.3d 584, 588 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001). “Whether there is probable cause to arrest depends on the information in the officers’ possession prior to the arrest.” Hinnah, 77 S.W.3d at 621.”

And the sufficient evidence to show reasonable grounds included:

*Appellant drove while intoxicated. Appellant’s mother, when asked if Appellant had been drinking, nodded her head “yes.”

*The odor of alcohol, slurred speech, lack of balance, and glassy, bloodshot eyes are indicia of intoxication. The Officer noted a moderate smell of alcohol emitting from Appellant at first contact, during a medical check, and at the police station. Officer observed Appellant slurring his speech.

*While Appellant was being escorted to the ambulance, Officer noticed Appellant was unsteady on his feet and his eyes were watery, glassy and slightly bloodshot.

*Appellant also scored five points on the HGN test. The highest possible score is six points, while a score of four or more points is an indication that a suspect is intoxicated.

*Appellant scored three points on the WAT test. A score of two or more points is an indication the suspect is intoxicated.

Appellant argues there could not have been probable cause to arrest him for driving while intoxicated because Officer did not observe Appellant operating his motor vehicle or the accident. Nor did Officer Berry know of Appellant’s condition at the time of operating the motor vehicle. Appellant argues there were no witnesses to the accident, nor a witness who testified to his condition immediately after the accident.

However, the Director does not need to prove the person was driving or was actually intoxicated while doing so. Instead, the officer may rely upon circumstantial evidence to logically infer the person was driving.

The Court further stated an officer may rely on information provided by witnesses to establish probable cause to believe a person was driving in an intoxicated condition.

Appellant had scratches and injuries to his face, consistent with being in a crash.

The vehicle engulfed in flames in the yard where Appellant was found was registered to Appellant.

Appellant’s father told Officer Appellant was driving and had an accident. All these facts, plus several others, were enough to satisfy the burden to showing that there was probable cause to believe that the Appellant was driving intoxicated.

In the end, the Appellate Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision. The opinion was written by Judge Philip M. Hess.